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OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
The threshold issue presented by this appeal is whether
an administrative agency, specifically the Pennsylvania Board of
Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons ("Pennsylvania
Board of Vehicles"), should be considered a "State court" for
purposes of allowing removal from it under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1988).

The issue is a legal one over which our review is

plenary.
I.
In September 1992, Sun Buick, Inc., t/a Sun Buick-Saab,
Inc., and Eugene Schlanger (collectively "Sun Buick"), who
operated a Buick dealership, purchased a Saab franchise and
entered into a franchise agreement with Saab Cars U.S.A., Inc.
Sun Buick operated the Saab dealership out of the same location
that it was operating the Buick dealership it owned.
On January 26, 1993, Sun Buick entered into an
agreement to sell the Saab franchise to intervenor Stephen
Melnick.

The agreement was contingent on Melnick securing a

dealership from Saab and he began to complete the necessary
paperwork.

In the meanwhile, on February 11, 1993 Sun Buick sold

the Buick dealership to S.B.I. Management Corp.

S.B.I. took over

Sun Buick's lot space and its dealer license, thereby divesting
the Saab dealership of both a location and a license.
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Because Saab had informed S.B.I. that Saab operations
could not continue on that lot, Sun Buick suggested to Saab two
alternative locations on which it could operate the Saab
dealership until completion of the sale to Melnick.

Saab

rejected the suggested locations allegedly because it had not
been given enough time to evaluate them, noting that allowing a
relocation at that time would create instability as the
dealership would presumably be moving again once it was sold.
In a letter dated February 23, 1993, Saab rejected
Melnick as a dealer on the ground that he did not have the staff
or facilities to begin operation of a dealership.

In the same

letter, Saab terminated its franchise with Sun Buick on three
grounds:

(1) Sun Buick lost its dealer license when it sold the

Buick dealership on February 11; (2) since that time and
continuing at least seven business days, no Saab operations were
conducted at the approved facility; and (3) Sun Buick's interest
in the approved facility was terminated in breach of its
obligation to maintain the facility.
The termination was effective immediately although Saab
acknowledged that Pennsylvania law requires that a manufacturer
give a dealer 60 days notice before termination except in a
situation where "the nature or character of the reason for
termination . . . is such that the giving of such notice would
not be in the public interest."
§818.9(c) (Supp. 1993).

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63,

Saab claimed that immediate termination

was in the public interest because Saab operations had ceased and
Sun Buick was unlicensed.

Saab alleged that it wished to be able
3

to establish replacement Saab representation as soon as possible
so that Saab customers in the area would have access to service.
On March 2, 1993, Sun Buick filed a complaint with the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles alleging that Saab's actions
violated the Board of Vehicles Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63,
§818.1 et seq. (Supp. 1993), by terminating the franchise without
good cause and the required 60 days notice,2 and in bad faith.
Sun Buick also alleged that Saab had unreasonably withheld
consent to the sale to Melnick in violation of section
818.9(b)(3).3

On March 17, Sun Buick filed a second complaint

with the Board of Vehicles alleging that Saab "improperly and
unfairly rejected the request for approval of the relocation of
[Sun Buick's] dealership facility."

App. at 37.

The Board

consolidated the two complaints.
2

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 818.9(c) (Supp. 1993) provides in
relevant part that:
It shall be a violation of this act for any
manufacturer . . . to unfairly, without due
regard to the equities . . . and without just
provocation cancel the franchise of any
distributor. . . . Not less than 60 days
advance notice of such termination . . .
shall be given . . . unless the nature and
character of the reason for termination . . .
is such that the giving of such notice would
not be in the public interest.
3

Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63 § 818.9(b)(3) (Supp. 1993) provides that
it is a violation of the Act for any manufacturer to:
Unreasonably withhold consent to the sale,
transfer or exchange of the franchise to a
qualified buyer capable of being licensed as
a new vehicle dealer in this Commonwealth.
4

Saab removed the action to federal district court on
March 29, 1993.

Melnick filed a motion to intervene, Sun Buick

moved to remand to the Board, and Saab moved to dismiss.

The

district court filed an opinion and order on June 23, 1993: (1)
denying a remand; (2) granting a dismissal for failure to state a
claim; and (3) dismissing the motion to intervene as moot.

Sun

Buick and Melnick appeal.4
II.
We must consider at the outset the underlying
jurisdictional issue presented by the district court's refusal to
remand this case to the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles.

28

U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1988) governs the removability of actions from
state to federal court and provides in relevant part that "any
civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant" (emphasis added).

Although Sun Buick

did not contend in its brief that the Board of Vehicles was not a
"court" for purposes of section 1441, we raised the issue sua
sponte pursuant to our obligation to be assured of our own
jurisdiction.

See Trent Realty Assocs. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan

Ass'n, 657 F. 2d 29, 35 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A federal court is bound
to consider its own jurisdiction preliminary to consideration of
the merits.").
A.
The "Functional Test"
4

Melnick did not file a timely appeal but we granted his motion
to intervene on behalf of the appellants.
5

On its face, the removal statute limits removal to
cases pending before a state "court."

This should be

dispositive, as the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles is, by
definition, not a "court."
The district court found, nonetheless, that the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles was a "court" for purposes of
removal because "an examination of its functions . . . revealed
that it was acting in an adjudicatory manner rather than in an
administrative one."

District court op. at 3-4.

In so holding,

it was following the prior determination by a judge of the same
court in Corwin Jeep Sales & Service, Inc. v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 670 F. Supp. 591, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1986), which
treated the Pennsylvania Board as a "court" because it would be
adjudicating a dispute between private parties, interpreting a
franchise contract and utilizing the same procedures that courts
use in deciding such disputes.
The genesis of the "functional test" for purposes of
removal appears to have been the decision in Tool & Die Makers
Lodge No. 78 International Ass'n of Machinists v. General
Electric Co. X-Ray Dep't, 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959), in
which the district court refused to remand to the Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board complaints filed by unions alleging
that an employer had engaged in unfair labor practices and
violated the collective bargaining agreement.

The court found

that the Employment Board was a "court" because the subject
matter was in essence breach of contract, the procedures that the
Board employed, e.g., taking depositions and issuing subpoenas,
6

were those of a court, and the Board could enter an order
requiring the person complained of to cease and desist from the
contract violations and reinstate the employees with or without
pay.
Two decades after the Tool & Die decision, the Court of
Appeals of the Seventh Circuit adopted the "functional test" to
allow removal from an administrative agency.

In Floeter v. C. W.

Transport, Inc., 597 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1979), the court held
that the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission was a "court"
for removal purposes.

The court adopted a "functional test" that

requires "evaluat[ing] the functions, powers, and procedures of
the state tribunal and . . . the respective state and federal
interests in the subject matter and in the provision of a forum."
Id. at 1101-02.

In deciding removal was proper, the court relied

on the facts that the action was one for breach of contract
between private parties, it would have to be decided by federal
law, the procedures and process of the Commission were
essentially judicial, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had
recognized that the Commission was vested with "judicial power."
Id. (quoting Layton Sch. of Art & Design v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 262 N.W.2d 218, 230 (Wis. 1978)).
Similarly, the First Circuit has stated, albeit in
dictum, in Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Labor
Relations Board, 454 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1972), that an action
before the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board would be removable
under the "functional test."

The court reasoned that the

proceedings before the Board were between private parties and
7

involved essentially a breach of contract dispute. Significantly,
the court relied on the judicial nature of the Board in general
and not just on the judicial nature of the current proceedings by
emphasizing the Board's "lack of rule-making or 'legislative'
power," "its adjudicative format," and the reference by the
Puerto Rico Supreme Court to the Board's function as being a
"quasi-judicial" one.

Id. at 44 & n.9.

The court lastly

reasoned that, in balancing federal and state interests, the
federal interest in deciding federal law outweighed whatever
interest the state may have.

See id. at 45.

The "functional test" was also used by the Fourth
Circuit in Kolibash v. Committee on Legal Ethics, 872 F.2d 571
(4th Cir. 1989), in its holding that a United States Attorney
could remove a state bar disciplinary proceeding to the federal
court.

The court reasoned that the proceeding was adjudicatory

in nature in that the Committee was an arm of the state court and
conducted itself as a court in holding evidentiary hearings and
taking testimony.

See id. at 576.

The force of Kolibash on the

issue before us is diminished, however, because removal in
Kolibash was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a),5 the federal officer
removal statute, which is broadly construed, as distinguished
5

28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988) provides in relevant part:
A civil action or criminal prosecution
commenced in a State court against any of the
following persons may be removed by them to
the district court . . . :
(1) Any officer of the United
States . . . for any act under
color of such office . . . .
8

from section 1441, the removal statute here, which is strictly
construed.

See id; Abels v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 770

F.2d 26 (3d Cir. 1985) (28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) "should be strictly
construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of remand").
In contrast to some of the above cases, the functional
test was disapproved in County of Nassau v. Cost of Living
Council, 499 F.2d 1340 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), where the
court rejected removal from the Cost of Living Council which had
issued an order limiting pay increases.

The court stated that

section 1441(a) contemplates removal from other court proceedings
rather than the "interruption of administrative proceedings." Id.
at 1343; see also California Packing Corp. v. I.L.W.U. Local 142,
253 F. Supp. 597, 598-99 (D. Haw. 1966) (holding removal from
administrative agencies improper because statute speaks to
removal only from courts and finding Tool & Die reasoning
"strained").
The courts that have adopted the "functional test" for
interpreting what is a "court" under section 1441 have relied in
large part on the reasoning used by the Supreme Court in Upshur
County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467 (1890), where the Court held that
notwithstanding the nomenclature of "county court" as the entity
from which removal was sought, the case did not involve a
removable "suit".

It is true that the Court looked to the actual

powers, composition and procedures of the entity in making its
decision, saying:
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The principle . . . is, that a proceeding,
not in a court of justice, but carried on by
executive officers in the exercise of their
proper functions, as in the valuation of
property for the just distribution of taxes
or assessments, is purely administrative in
its character, and cannot, in any just sense,
be called a suit . . . .
[T]he appeal from the assessment was
made to the 'county court' eo nomine, yet
that this is not a judicial body, invested
with judicial functions, except in matters of
probate; but is the executive or
administrative board of the county, charged
with the management of its financial and
executive affairs.
Id. at 477; see also Village of Walthill v. Iowa Elec. Light &
Power Co., 228 F.2d 647, 648-53 (8th Cir. 1956) (holding removal
from the Nebraska "condemnation court" improper in that "[t]he
three-judge condemnation court [was] in reality just another
board of appraisers").
It does not follow that because Upshur County held that
a court is not necessarily a "court" for removal purposes, the
Supreme Court has endorsed the view that an administrative agency
might be a "court" for removal purposes.

Therefore, we find

questionable the reasoning of the Tool & Die court that the
Supreme Court has adopted a functional test which would require
us to judge the propriety of removal from a tribunal "by
reference to the procedures and functions of the State tribunal
rather than the name by which the tribunal is designated."

170

F. Supp. at 950.
There is further evidence in other Supreme Court
decisions from the same era that Upshur County did not broadly
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adopt a "functional test" by which an administrative body would
be treated as a "court" for federal removal purposes simply
because it performs a judicial function.

In those cases, when

the Court held that removal was proper it was careful to note
that the body in question was a judicial body under state law.
For example, in Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining
Co., 196 U.S. 239, 250-51 (1905), the Court stated:
We cannot doubt, in view of the authorities,
that the case presented in the County Court
was a "suit" or "controversy between citizens
of different States," within the meaning of
the Constitution and the laws of the United
States. It was, as already said, a judicial
proceeding initiated in a tribunal which
constitutes a part of the judicial
establishment of Kentucky, as ordained by its
Constitution . . . ; and the court, although
charged with some duties of an administrative
character, is a judicial tribunal and a court
of record.
(emphasis added).
Similarly, in Commissioners of Road Improvement
District No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co., 257 U.S.
547, 556-57 (1922), the Court, in upholding a removal from an
Arkansas County Court, noted that the Arkansas constitution
invested that court with "judicial power" and that the state
supreme court had "held the County Court to be a court and
capable of rendering judgment in a proceeding whose judicial
character is much more questionable than here."

We have found no

case from the Supreme Court, nor have the parties cited one,
holding that a case can be removed from an administrative agency
to federal court on the grounds that the administrative agency is
functionally a court.
11

This court has previously examined the status of
administrative agencies as "courts" in another context, i.e., the
section of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1988),
which provides that a private citizen enforcement action may not
proceed if "the Administrator or State has commenced . . . a
civil action in a court of the United States or a State."
U.S.C. § 7604(b)(1)(B) (1988) (emphasis added).

42

In Baughman v.

Bradford Coal Co., 592 F.2d 215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
961 (1979), we had to decide whether the federal court had
jurisdiction over the private action notwithstanding that the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources had already
begun an action against the same defendant before the
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.

We stated that for

that purpose, "an administrative board may be a 'court' if its
powers and characteristics make such a classification necessary
to achieve statutory goals."

Id. at 217.

However, we held that

the Pennsylvania Hearing Board was not a court in that it "lacked
the power to enjoin violations" of the company's effluent
restrictions, was "empowered only to assess a penalty which
[could] not exceed $10,000," and there was "lack of citizen
intervention of right in the agency proceeding."

Id. at 218-219.

We considered the identical citizen suit provision,
albeit in the Clean Water Act, in Student Public Interest
Research Group v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131,
1136 (3d Cir. 1985), where we held, relying on Baughman, that an
EPA enforcement action was not a "court" proceeding.
characterized the Baughman inquiry as a dual one:
12

We

The first question to be answered is whether
the coercive powers that the administrative
agency possesses compel compliance with
effluent limitations . . . . The second
inquiry concerns the procedural similarities
the agency proceeding might have to a suit in
federal court.
Id. at 1137.

We noted that the EPA's enforcement powers under

the Act were very limited, consisting of the power to issue
"permits, modify permits, and terminate permits for
noncompliance," and that it could not impose any civil penalty,
while a district court could assess fines of up to $10,000 a day.
Id. at 1138.

We also noted that the procedure the EPA followed

in its enforcement proceedings did not resemble that of a court
in that there was no independent decisionmaker, no witnesses, no
records kept, and no evidence presented by opposing parties.

See

also Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d
504, 506-07 (3d Cir. 1985) (under identical citizen suit
provisions in other environmental statutes, EPA's compliance
order not a suit in a court because the administrative tribunal
did not have "power to accord relief equivalent to that available
from a court").
We need not decide the viability of the dictum in these
cases suggesting that a court's right to proceed with a citizen's
suit in an environmental case might be precluded by action before
an administrative agency as well as before a court, because the
issue here is a different one.

However, it is of some interest

that the Baughman reasoning was rejected by both the Second and
Ninth Circuits.

In Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail

13

Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit interpreted
the same citizen suit provision of the Clear Air Act that was at
issue in Baughman.

The court, reasoning that when a statute is

unambiguous the court's task is simply to enforce it as written,
held that it would be "inappropriate to expand th[e] language to
include administrative enforcement actions" as equivalent to
those of civil actions in a "court."

Id. at 62.

Similarly, the

Ninth Circuit rejected Baughman in Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1525 (9th Cir. 1987), stating "[w]e prefer
the Second Circuit's reading . . . over the Third Circuit's
reading."

The court emphasized that it would not take the

"extraordinary step of ignoring the plain language of the
statute."

Id.
Even if we were still inclined to follow Baughman's

application of the "functional" test for purposes of permitting
maintenance of a private citizen enforcement suit in
environmental litigation, the removal context is sufficiently
distinct to make the cases distinguishable.

What is significant

is that no case in this court ever held that an administrative
agency was actually a "court."

Nevertheless, we may pretermit

the decision whether removal under section 1441(a) from an
administrative agency is ever permissible in an exceptional case,
because it is clear that the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles would
not qualify under any circumstances.
B.
Status of the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles

14

Under any test, the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles
would not qualify as a court because its lack of judicial
attributes is similar to that of the agencies which we held were
not courts in the environmental cases.

As we stated in Baughman,

"[g]enerally, the word 'court' in a statute is held to refer only
to the tribunals of the judiciary and not to those of an
executive agency with quasi-judicial powers."

592 F.2d at 217.

It follows that even if an entity is not called a "court," it
must have the attributes of a court before it should be
considered as one.
Rather than possessing the powers of a court, the
Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles administers and enforces the Board
of Vehicles Act.

It regulates the licensing of salespersons,

dealers, brokers and manufacturers.

It passes on the

qualifications for licensure, investigates allegations of
wrongful acts, and brings criminal prosecutions for unauthorized
practices (i.e. acts as a prosecutor).

An examination of the

Board's powers and duties makes it clear that its powers are
those of the usual type of administrative agency rather than
those of a court.6
6

Section 818.4 entitled "Powers and duties of board" provides:
The board shall have the power and its duty
shall be to:
(1) Provide for and regulate the licensing
of salespersons, dealers, brokers,
manufacturers, factory branches,
distributors, distributor branches, factory
or distributor representatives and
wholesalers as defined in this act.

15

(2) Review and pass upon the
qualifications of applicants for licensure
and to issue, except as otherwise provided
herein, a license to engage in the said
businesses to any applicant who is approved
by the board and who meets the requirements
of this act.
(3) Investigate on its own initiative,
upon complaint of the Department of
Transportation, Department of Community
Affairs, Department of Revenue or the Office
of the Attorney General, or upon the verified
complaint in writing of any person, any
allegations of the wrongful act or acts of
any licensee or person required to be
licensed hereunder.
(4) Administer and enforce this act and to
impose appropriate administrative discipline
upon licensees found to be in violation of
this act.
(5) Bring criminal prosecutions for
unauthorized, unlicensed or unlawful
practices and bring an action to enjoin such
practices.
(6) Require each licensee to register
biennially with the board.
(7) Keep a record showing the names and
addresses of all licensees licensed under
this act.
(8) Keep minutes and records of all its
transactions and proceedings especially with
relation to the issuance, denial,
registration, formal reprimand, suspension
and revocation of licenses. In all actions
or proceedings in any court, a transcript of
any board record or any part thereof, which
is certified to be a true copy by the board,
shall be entitled to admission in evidence.
(9) Adopt, promulgate and enforce such
rules and regulations not inconsistent with
this act as are deemed necessary and proper
to effectuate the provisions of this act,

16

In the cases following Baughman where we determined
that various administrative actions were not proceedings in a
"court," we held that an administrative agency would not be
considered a court if it did not have the "power to accord relief
equivalent to that available from a court."
at 506-07.

Proffitt, 754 F.2d

The Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles does not have such

power in that it cannot award damages.

Its powers of action to

afford relief are circumscribed: it can only enjoin a franchise
termination alleged to be in violation of section 818.9(c) or the
addition or relocation of a new vehicle dealer that is in
violation of section 818.18,7 and it can impose disciplinary
sanctions.

As the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court has

recognized:
including but not limited to, established
place of business.
(10) Submit annually, to the
Transportation Committees of the House and
Senate, a description of the types of
complaints received, status of the cases,
board action which has been taken and length
of time from the initial complaint to final
board resolution.
(11) Submit annually to the department an
estimate of the financial requirements of the
board for its administrative, investigative,
legal and miscellaneous expenses.
(12) Submit annually to the House and
Senate Appropriations Committees, 15 days
after the Governor has submitted his budget
to the General Assembly, a copy of the budget
request for the upcoming year which the board
previously submitted to the department.
7
Section 818.18 governs when a new vehicle dealer may be
established or relocated into a relevant market area where the
same line-make is already represented.
17

The Act provides for a temporary stay in the
event of a franchise termination appeal
brought under Section 9(c). It does not,
however, imbue the Board with injunctive
powers in any other area. Consequently, any
determination by the Board that a
manufacturer has acted unreasonably in
withholding consent to the sale of a
franchise under Section 9(b)(3) could result
only in a disciplinary sanction against the
manufacturer.
University Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Board of Vehicle
Manufacturers, 576 A.2d 1146, 1150 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1990).
The limited nature of the Board's powers was also
emphasized in Trailmobile, Inc. v. State Board of Manufacturers,
612 A.2d 574 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 634 A.2d 226
(Pa. 1993):
The Act grants certain disciplinary
powers to the Board. When the Board
determines that a violation of the Act has
been committed it may formally reprimand,
suspend the license of, or refuse to issue or
renew the license of the violator.
Additionally, Section 19 of the Act provides
that the Board may levy a civil penalty of
$1,000 upon any current licensee who violates
a provision of the Act.
We reject Tri-State's request for
additional relief because the Act is specific
in its grant of power to the Board. We have
already stated that the power and authority
to be exercised by administrative commissions
must be conferred clearly and unmistakably by
the legislature; a doubtful power does not
exist. Other than the temporary stay that
may be issued in a suspected violation of
Section 18 of the Act, and the permanent
injunction that may issue if the Board
determines that there is good cause for not
permitting the addition or relocation of a
new vehicle dealer under Section 18, the Act
does not grant the Board injunctive powers.

18

Id. at 576 (citations omitted).

The fact that the Board can only

assess fines of $1,000 is significant considering our reliance in
Baughman on the Environmental Hearing Board's ability to impose
fines of only $10,000 as one of the factors influential to our
finding that the Board was not a "court."

592 F.2d at 1218.

We assume that the Pennsylvania legislature expressly
provided that any person who may be injured by a violation of the
Act may bring an action for damages, including punitive damages,
or equitable relief including injunctive relief in any court of
competent jurisdiction8 in recognition of the Board's inability
to award damages or full injunctive relief.
Not only does the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicle's have
a dearth of judicial-type powers but its composition also has
none of the characteristics of a court such as disinterestedness,
8

Section 818.20 entitled "Civil actions for violations" provides:
(a) Action for damages. -- Notwithstanding
the terms, provisions or conditions of any
agreement or franchise or other terms or
provisions of any novation, waiver or other
written instrument, any person who is or may
be . . . injured in his business or property
by a violation of a provision of this act
relating to that franchise, or any person so
injured because he refuses to accede to a
proposal for an arrangement which, if
consummated, would be in violation of this
act, may bring an action for damages and
equitable relief, including injunctive
relief, in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(b) Punitive Damages. -- If any person
engages in continued multiple violations of a
provision or provisions of this act, the
court may award punitive damages in addition
to any other damages under this act.
19

separation from the executive and learnedness in the law.

The

Board is composed of three new car dealers, three used car
dealers, one mobile home dealer, one salesperson, one
recreational dealer, one motorcycle dealer, the Commissioner of
Professional and Occupational Affairs, the Secretary of the
Department of Transportation or his designee, the Director of
Consumer Protection in the Office of Attorney General or his
designee and four members of the general public having no
connection to the vehicle business.
§ 818.3(a) (Supp. 1993).

See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63,

This composition is unlike that of a

court in that it is composed mostly of people who have jobs other
than that of serving as judges, see Pa. Const. art. 5, § 17(a)
(mandating that judges devote full time to their judicial
duties), and includes members of the executive branch as well as
persons who are likely to be partial toward dealers and their
industry.

While lay persons may sometimes be well versed in the

law, the absence of any requirement of legal knowledge or
experience by almost all of the members of the Board is striking.
Additionally, Pennsylvania, itself, does not consider
the Board a court.

See Trailmobile, 612 A.2d at 576; University

Lincoln Mercury, 576 A.2d at 1150.

It is not described in the

portions of the Pennsylvania Constitution related to its court
system, see Pa. Const. art. 5, or in the Pennsylvania statutes
relating to the court system.

See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. et

seq. (1981 & Supp. 1993).
In enumerating the ways in which the Pennsylvania Board
of Vehicles is unlike a court, it becomes clear that Floeter,
20

Volkswagen, and Tool & Die are distinguishable on their facts. In
both Floeter and Volkswagen, the administrative agencies had been
acknowledged by their state supreme courts as having judicial
powers, and the agencies had more judicial powers and procedures
than the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles has.

The Tool & Die

court relied in part on powers that the administrative agency at
issue there had that exceeded the powers of the Board of
Vehicles, namely, ordering the affirmative relief of
reinstatement of employees with pay.
Finally, we note that the district court in this case
adopted the analysis used in Corwin Jeep Sales, 670 F. Supp. at
593-95, when it held that removal was proper if the Board "was
acting in an adjudicatory manner rather than in an administrative
one."

District court op. at 3-4.

However, this reasoning

inappropriately conflates two requirements of the removal
statute.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action" of which

the district courts have original jurisdiction and was "brought
in a State court" may be removed to the district court.

The

requirement that it be a "civil action" is separate from the
requirement that it be brought in a "State court."
The distinction was made clear in Commissioners of Road
Improvement District No. 2 v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway, 257
U.S. 547, 550 (1922), where the Supreme Court analyzed these
requirements separately in deciding whether a proceeding in a
state county court "to assess benefits and damages growing out of
a road improvement was properly removed to the federal District
Court."

The Court, after noting that the county court had been
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recognized by the state supreme court to be a court, went on to
examine the proceeding to determine whether it was a "judicial
controversy," as opposed to an administrative concern:
Of course, the statutory designation of the
action of a body as a judgment, or the
phrasing of its finding and conclusion in the
usual formula of a judicial order, is not
conclusive of the character in which it is
acting. When we find, however, that the
proceeding before it has all the elements of
a judicial controversy, to wit, adversary
parties and an issue in which the claim of
one of the parties against the other capable
of pecuniary estimation, is stated and
answered in some form of pleading, and is to
be determined, we must conclude that this
constitutional court is functioning as such.
Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
If we analyze the status of the Pennsylvania Board of
Vehicles separately from the nature of the proceedings before it,
it becomes clear that, in general, the Board's procedures,
functions, and character do not make it a court.

It is therefore

irrelevant whether the proceeding may qualify as a "civil action"
because it is a contract dispute between two private parties, or
even whether it could be brought as an original proceeding in the
district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

The

matter was not brought in a "State court" and therefore was not
removable under section 1441(a).
III.
Applying the general principle that the removal statute
is to be strictly construed, we hold that an administrative
agency without the attributes of a court should not be considered
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a "State court" under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Therefore, we will

reverse the judgment of dismissal of the district court and
remand this case to the district court with directions that it be
remanded to the Pennsylvania Board of Vehicles.
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